Autonomous Security Management in Optical Networks by Natalino Da Silva, Carlos et al.
Autonomous Security Management in Optical Networks
Downloaded from: https://research.chalmers.se, 2021-12-11 21:25 UTC
Citation for the original published paper (version of record):
Natalino Da Silva, C., Di Giglio, A., Schiano, M. et al (2021)
Autonomous Security Management in Optical Networks
Optical Fiber Communications Conference and Exhibition (OFC), 2021
N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.
research.chalmers.se offers the possibility of retrieving research publications produced at Chalmers University of Technology.
It covers all kind of research output: articles, dissertations, conference papers, reports etc. since 2004.
research.chalmers.se is administrated and maintained by Chalmers Library
(article starts on next page)
Autonomous Security Management in Optical
Networks
Carlos Natalino1, Andrea Di Giglio2, Marco Schiano2, Marija Furdek1
1Electrical Engineering Department, Chalmers University of Technology, 41296 Gothenburg, Sweden
2Telecom Italia, Via Guglielmo Reiss Romoli, 274 – 10148 Turin, Italy
furdek@chalmers.se
Abstract: The paper describes the Optical Security Manager module and focuses on the
role of Machine Learning (ML) techniques. Issues related to accuracy, run-time complexity
and interpretability of ML outputs are described and coping strategies outlined. © 2021
The Author(s)
1. Secure Optical Networks Enabling Network Evolution Beyond 5G
The growing deployment of 5G networks across the world starts to enable industry and academia to contrive
the next milestones for networks Beyond 5G (B5G). Among the expectations, higher data rates, stricter latency
requirements and the need for more power/spectrum efficient networks are a recurrent consensus [1]. Stronger
integration between optical and wireless networks blended with edge/cloud computing can enable significant
advances in fulfilling these requirements. This may require transition from the provisioning of 5G end-to-end
services towards end-to-end optical-transparent services, eliminating intermediate exchange points and optical-
electrical-optical conversions. End-to-end optical-transparent services would mean that lightpaths transparently
connect base stations to edge/cloud sites that perform base-band processing co-located with the service processing.
This requires extending the optical domain further towards the edge, and establishing lightpaths across multiple
network segments and domains.
Although very beneficial in many aspects, end-to-end optical-transparent services may aggravate security risks
at the optical layer and their impact to overlay services. When lightpaths traverse different network segments
(e.g., access, metro, core, intra-datacenter), attacks targeting the optical layer can have higher disruption potential
than in current architectures with optical-electrical-optical conversions at each segment exchange point. Filtering
optical devices can mitigate a subset of attacks and reduce their propagation in the network. However, certain
networking solutions such as filterless architectures reduce or completely eliminate the use of filtering devices to
maximize cost-efficiency [2, 3], which intensifies the disruption potential of attack techniques such as jamming.
The increasing deployment of fiber and the transition towards networks supporting rapid and frequent state
changes calls for intelligent, fast and reliable management of optical network security. Autonomous security
management frameworks are essential for the secure and stable operation of optical networks in the evolving
security threat scenario. Such frameworks represent an important novel feature in the cognitive NMS (C-NMS)
paradigm [4] that relies on controllers to provide end-to-end services demanded by an orchestrator and easily
accessible to users and external systems via standard application programming interfaces (APIs).
Our proposed optical security assurance framework, illustrated in Fig. 1, entails functionalities for telemetry,
detection and identification of security breaches, remediation and neutralization of threats [5]. Telemetry func-
tions include collection and storage of the optical performance monitoring (OPM) data from the coherent optical
transceivers (potentially from other devices as well), or from the network controller. Detection and identification
of threats requires a deep insight into the OPM data to identify anomalies and correctly attribute them to differ-
ent attack techniques, which is a task that greatly benefits from machine learning (ML) techniques as the most
promising approach to enable such a concept. Security statuses of individual connections derived by ML from
the data retrieved from the coherent transceivers can then be correlated to perform localization of the breached
network element. The detection and localization of the breach are important preconditions for remediation of the
threat, which can be performed in two steps. The first step refers to a quick fix (e.g. simple rerouting) aimed at
minimizing the down time, while the second entails a more complete set of tailored countermeasures for ultimate
elimination of the breach.
Adoption of ML in network Security Operation Centers (SOCs) meets important challenges related to, among
others, the availability of representative data, the accuracy and run-time complexity of ML models, the reliability
and interpretability of the models’ outputs, and the model resilience to adversary attacks. We address a fraction
of these challenges linked to model accuracy, run-time complexity and interpretability, and outline strategies to
overcome them.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the optical security manager embedded into the cognitive transport software
defined (T-SDN) controller.
2. Machine Learning for Network Security Diagnostics
Machine learning techniques are an auspicious contender for automation of many complex network control and
management tasks ranging from Quality of Transmission (QoT) estimation of unestablished lightpaths [6] to
failure detection [7]. These techniques play a particularly relevant role in the context of security, where their
demonstrated effectiveness in distinguishing intricate effects of various security breaches on OPM parameters can
provide important diagnostic support to network security specialists.
Supervised learning (SL) approaches, such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), rely on a priori available
complete information about what needs to be learned in the form of an expert-labeled representative dataset. This
allows them to provide fine-granular diagnostic information upon training, e.g. the type of the breach and its
intensity. Unsupervised learning (UL) techniques, such as Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with
Noise (DBSCAN), do not have a labeled dataset at their disposal. Instead, they learn to cluster the data so as to
separate the normal from anomalous samples that appear as outliers. Consequently, they can only provide coarse
information on the presence of an attacks without further details. However, due to the ability to detect previously
unseen events they have a major advantage in detecting new types of security breaches. Semi-supervised learning
(SSL) approaches, such as One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM), are similar to UL in the absence of
previous knowledge of attacks (and, hence, in their ability to detect novel types of breaches), and are akin to SL
in the training on a small amount of labeled normal-condition data that facilitates outlier detection.
2.1. Achieving High Accuracy of ML Models
To provide high accuracy, an ML model should attain excellent performance in matching the predicted outputs to
the actual inputs, measured, e.g., in terms of false positive and false negative rates. The former refers to raising false
alarms under attack-free conditions, while the latter refers to unnoticed attack presence. Due to the a priori defined
mappings between inputs and outputs, SL techniques have been reported to obtain high accuracy in detection and
identification of attacks [8]. However, studies on SSL and UL have identified difficulties in achieving equivalently
high accuracy in attack detection [9], demanding additional scrutiny in using the ML models’ diagnostic outputs.
A promising strategy to overcome the issue of false positive and false negative rates of the ML algorithms and
reduce the impact of possible fast oscillations in the detected security status is Window-based Attack Detection
(WAD) [9]. Instead of directly using the output of an ML model obtained in each monitoring cycle, WAD observes
the diagnostic output over a pre-defined window and raises an alarm only when the number of samples categorized
as an attack exceeds a pre-defined threshold. By tuning the values of the window size and the threshold, a trade-off
can be achieved between the false detection probability and the time to raise an alarm upon an attack.
2.2. Reducing Run-time Complexity of ML Models
Commercially available coherent digital signal processing (DSP)-enabled transceivers can provide a rich set of
analog and digital signal parameters. For example, in each minute, the Network Management System (NMS) can
receive minimum, maximum and average values of a dozen optical performance monitoring (OPM) parameters.
Such high number of features processed at high recurrence is beneficial for many ML models, but it may result in a
high processing load. Therefore, to reduce run-time complexity, the relevance of the features should be examined,
and additional dimensionality reduction techniques should be applied.
In SL, the rich labeled dataset can be manipulated during training and testing to understand the relevance of the
features to the accuracy. In [8], it was shown that the number of features reported to the NMS can be almost halved
without impacting the classification error of the ANN. However, eliminating OPM parameters from UL and SSL
processing may cause these models to miss emerging types of threats. Instead, these models can be combined with
dimensionality reduction techniques that transform the dataset while encoding its diversity.
In [5], the DBSCAN and OCSVM are combined with three dimensionality reduction approaches. The first,
principal component analysis (PCA), tries to encode as much variance as possible from the original dataset into
the encoded dataset. The second approach, called t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE), tries to
approximate the distances between samples in the encoded dataset to the ones found in the original dataset. The
third technique, an autoencoder, is a neural network trained containing a feature extraction layer, and trained such
that the output matches the input as closely as possible. After training, the encoder part of the neural network is
used for dimensionality reduction. The observed benefit of these techniques is the most significant for DBSCAN
combined with PCA, improving both the accuracy and the run time compared to processing the full data set.
2.3. Achieving Interpretability of ML Models’ Outputs
While the automation of security management is expected to reduce the requirements on interventions by human
experts, they are unlikely to be completely eliminated. Instead, effort is needed to improve the interaction between
the humans and ML by, among other aspects, making the output of the ML models more easily interpretable
by the security specialists. This would allow the security managers to understand why an ML model attributes a
particular setting to an attack and which trends in various OPM parameters triggered such a response. To this end,
a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) framework was proposed that analyzes the clusters of OPM data constructed by
a UL algorithm [10]. When an anomaly is detected, the framework computes the difference between the average
value of each feature in the anomalous samples and the average value of the same feature in the closest normal
cluster. The computed difference is then visualized across all features in the form of an anomaly vector. The vector
goes beyond simple time series visualization that is the currently used approach and provides meaningful insights
into the detected deviations in the entire feature set.
3. Open Challenges and Opportunities
As a challenging and evolving subject, the management of optical network security requires numerous novel
procedures to be developed and incorporated in dynamic production settings. One of the still largely unaddressed
problems is attack remediation, which should encompass definition of protocols and strategies to reconfigure the
optical network upon the detection/identification of an attack. Here too ML techniques can play an important
role in e.g. long-term tracking of reputation of different network elements and services, as well as adaptation of
initially deterministic remediation strategies to cope with an intelligent and adaptive adversary. As attack reports
and data may be subject to non-disclosure agreements, security-enhancing collaboration among multiple network
stakeholders may benefit from the application of federated ML to preserve privacy. Maintaining security of the
control plane and using blockchain can help ensure data integrity and exchange of verified model updates.
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